Catholic documents. and specifically the Vatican Declaralion on EUlhanasia of 1980. frame the discussion on care of the terminally ill with the fundamental assertion that life is a gift which we hold in trust. not a possess ion over which we have absolute dominion.! It is our moral responsibi lity to nourish. prese rve and protect li fe , while acknow ledging our human limitations-ultimatel y the limitation of death it self. The Catholic position on the use of life-sustaining trea tment in the care of the terminally ill derives from these basic convict ions about life and death.
To recognize that life is a gift and death an unavoidable end to human life as we experience it da y by da y is not yet to tell the whole story. Catho lics believe that. despite the universal human experience of death as a mysterious and fearsome rupture , it is also the on ly 'Passage to the fullness of life. As believers , Catholics try to comfort each other and encourage one another to welcome that fuller life in Christ even in the throes of fear and pain. In these moments people become aware of their vulnerab ilit y as human beings. They learn that to be human -especially in a health care setting where there is so much sickness and death -is to live as gracefully as possible the ten sio n between trying to eliminate threats to life and health and accepting the fact that some life threats cannot be eliminated 2 Broadly speaking, any intervention which will eliminate a threat to life or health , e.g. , antibiotics, can be said to be life-sustaining, as can any treatment which supplements a ph ys iological function , e.g ., insulin or blood products. However, the treatment decisions which have ca used the most consternation are those that artificially supplant vital functions , such as kidney dialysis machines and especially respirators.
A m o ng the questions about whether to provid e ce rtain life-saving trea tm en ts to patie nt s. the mos t difficult. per haps. are th ose th a t ask about the withholding and withdrawing o f nutriti o n a nd hyd rati on provided thr o ug h IVs or feeding tubes. These questions will be ad dressed here within the context of traditional Catholic tea chin g on the te rminall y ill. That is. we will no t treat these qu es tions as if th ey required th eir ow n kind o f justifica tion. but as ques ti o ns alrea d y covered by the principles which goye rn the use of ordinary and ext raordinary mea ns. Cath o lic mo ral discourse on th ese ques tions reflects a strong e mphasis on th e mo rall y dec isi\T imp o rtan ce of th e pati e nt's well-being in all deci s io ns about continuing or withdrawing lifc support treatm ents. Beca use th e re are a number of important ways in which the situati o n of a severely disabled newborn infant differs from adults who are nea r dea th. I will not attempt to address here the spec ial case o f th e seriously ill new born .
Catholic Teaching on Ordinary and Extraordinary Means
S in ce the moral thcologian . Banel. introduced th e terms "ordinary" and "cx tra o rdinary" mcans into thc discussion of our duti es regarding th e prese ryation o flifcat th ec nd ofthc 16th ccnt ur y. we ha\T lear ned that we are obligated to tak e "ordinary mean s" to sustain our life and heal th. but we are not o bligated to takc "extraordinary mea ns". Th e th eo logical commentary which followed Ban ez attempt ed to clarify what these terms mea nt in practice by identifying what should count as ex traordinary (e .g .. surge ry before anti se ptics and an es th etics). Some treatm e nts were declared extraordinary becausc too painful. repulsive to th e pati e nt or ex pens i ve. Ea 1' 1 y d efi n it ions of 0 I'd i na ry mea ns as "wha t na t ure intends" or "w ha t is generally a vailable to a ll". turn ed out to be lcss helpful in the co nt ex t of clinical medicin e. In the 1940s and ear ly ·SOs. Ge rald Kell y rev iewed the hist o ry of these basic moral te rms and formulat ed working definitions more apt for eva luating the practice of mod e rn clinical med ici ne. ' Hi s updat ed definitions mad e a distinction betwee n ord fnary means and ex traordinary mea ns which labeled "e x traordinary" those which "cannot be o btained o r used with o ut excessive ex pense. pain. or other inc o nve nience. o r which. if used . would no t o lTer a rea so nabl e hope of be nefi t" . and o rdill IIr.\'. those which "0 ITer a reaso nable hope of bend it and whi c h ca n be o btain ed and used without excessive ex pe nse. pain o r o th er inc onve nienc e".~
Cronin Reworked Definitions
Daniel Cro nin rewo rk ed Ke ll y's d efinitions in a way which gave slight ly more e mph as is to spec ific ci rcu mstances and the uniqu eness of the indi vidual pati ent : Extraordinary mean s o f clll1scn" ing life m~ly he defined as those means not common ly ll sed in g i\'cil circumstances. o r tho st.:' mea ns which this iIH.li\"i<.lua\ in his present physical. psychological and eco no mic condition cann ot n:asonahly cmp l",·. or. if hc can. lIill not giw him ddinitc hopc of proportionatc hcncfit. ' Both of th ese sets of definitions refl ec t clea rl y th e importance of the patient's assessment of w hat is ext ra ord in ary -too much to bear when compared with the therapeutic outcomes which can be realistically hoped for . This clear e mphasis is, in fact. charac teristic of Cat hol ic moral teac hing on the care of the grave ly ill.
Contemporaneous with Ke ll y's and Cronin's work, Pop e Pius X II identified ordinary means with means which do not in vo lve any "grave burden for onese lf or another" . "A more strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men and wo uld render the a tt ainme nt of the high e r, more important good too difficult," he discerned.(' While th e patient's dUly in light of these principles was often difficu lt to d iscern in practice, th e doctor's was even more comp li cated. He had a spec ia l dut y to the profession of medicin e and the larger fam il y of hu mank ind to stave offall temptations to "defeatism" under the threat of pathology , and thu s to take aggressive s teps to preserve life.
Kelly observed that some doctors adopted what he ca lled a "moderate" moral p osture regarding their responsibility to th e terminally ill patient: others, an "ex treme" posture. He cites a doctor w ho, in his view, character izes the moderate post ure:
Mv d ut y, as I see it. is to preservc lifc, to fight for a paticnt's lifc with evcry resou rccatmycommand. rcmcmhcr ingalwa ys that'a man's ncvc rli ckcd till hc's lick cd.' Buttherc comes a time whc n he is li cked. If a doctor has train edi ud g mcnt and experience a nd that desperate dislike of dcfeat w hich is instilled int o eac h of us, he knows so metimes, becausc he knows hi s pathology, that every human thing ha s bee n done: that he cannot preserve life t hat the d ec ision has bcen take n from hil11.
,
And th e n hi s duty, Ithink, isjust as clear -t o mak e th a t patient comfo rt able by scdati ves if he can, regardless of anything e lse a nd how much it tak es to do so.' Those with what Kelly ca lled the "extreme" attitude would see their dut y in simpler, more categorical terms: to prese rve life as long as possible by any means at their disposal. When attending to a d ying patient or permanently comatose patient , the moral task of the "extremists" was simple; they had one ru le to follow. The "moderates" by contrast, had the task of assess ing whether a particular treatment was likely to be of any benefit to this patient , and thus , whether it was worth the pain, effo rt and expense, The problem with relying on a sing le moral principle that requires us to preserve life with all the means available in a period of advanced biotechnology is that after a whi le a ll means become ordinarr in practice.
Situations of Life-Sustaining Treatments
When technologically comp lex life-sustaining treatments became November, 1987 increasingly easy to provid e clinically and financially. we e nd ed up sanctifying with the moral principle. "Do everything". what in man y cases we were d o ing for an esse ntially nonm ora l (if not, in some circumstances . immoral) reason: ease and convenience of administration. We felt we should "do eve rything" . but we got to th e point where we were no longe r asking th e moral reason why. So now we ha ve to ask . is it because it is easy for us. or beca us e it is the right thing t o do for the patient') Over time . the moral concerns found in papa l statements and theological commentary about th e "grave burden" imposed on th e dying patient b y certain treatments were stifled by the " technological impe rative" posing as a moral imperative . Now we have to look more closely at the mora l imperative: what are we. ind eed. obligated to do for the patient')
The Vatican f)ec/aration on 1:'lIfhanasia which came out in 1980. recogniled the shift in the meanings of ordinan' and e.\'traordinarr and th e resulting co nfusion. They drew from the ongoing th eo logical in4uiry into these issues the concepts proportionate and di.lpro/}()rtionate in order to clarify the moral meaning 0.1' ordinary and ex traordinary. In the words of the f)ec/aration. a judgment can be made as to whether a particular m ed ical intervention is a proportion ate or disproportionate means of sustaining life b y st ud y i ng lhe type of t rL'al lll L' nt to hc lIscd. its dc.:grcL' or complexity or risk. it s cos t a nd till' r oss ihiliti cs of lI sing. it. and comp;:lring these clemc nts \\" ith th e result that ca n he e.\rec ted. l<Iking int o accollnt th e state or thc sick rcrson and his or he r physical and moral resources.
It is important to interpret th e Dhi('a/ and Re/igious DireClil'es in light of this refinement of terms in Catholic m ora l tradition as it ha s developed in res p onse to medical science. x Directive 28. for example reads. "The failure to supply the ordinary means o f preserv ing life is e4uivalent to euthanasia . Howe ve r neither the physician nor the patient is obliged to the use of ex traordinary means ." In the li g ht of th e Dec/aration, this directive IT 4uires that life-sustaining measures which are not dll'{Jro/wrtionatelr burd e nsom e (ethica/lrextraordinary) be provid ed forthe patient, butdoes Illit re4u ire the prov ision of those which are burdensome or w ithout realistic hope of benefit. Moreover. Directive 33 explicitly rules out treatments which are disproporti o nat e. th a t is. unjustifiable in terms of pred ictabl e benefit to the patient when all of the factors affecting the pati e nt's co ndition are taken into account. "Unnecessary procedures. whether diagnostic or therapeutic . are morally objectionable. A procedure is unn ecessa ry when no proportionat e reason justifies it. A furtiuri, any proced ure that is contra-indicated by so und medical standard s is unnecessa ry." Even if a physician s hould judge it advisable to continue a particular life-s ustaining treatment, the pa tient (or family membe r on be ha If of ani ncom peten t pa tien!) ca n refus e trea tment which is excessively burd e nsome .
Those who raise ethical 4ue s t ions in regard to withholding or withdrawing life support in this era of modern medicine are usuall y asking what we ought to dolor a patient , or what we arejustified in no/ doing/c)r a patient. The question s are about treatment, medical interve ntions by the practitione rs of medical science to remove or mitigate threat s to th e patient's life and health. There is ofte n th e unspoke n ass umption that whe n "nothing more can be done ," ph ys ician s have no furth e r obligation to the pati ent. But a moral tra dition that gives decisive weight to how a particula r treatment affects a patient's comfort and moral support also carries implied obligation s to provid e for those needs as long as the terminally ill patient continues to live.
Withholding Intravenous and Tube Feeding
The most pressing of ~he new que stions about the artificial supplanting of vital function s is that of replacing naural eating and drinking with artificial nutrition and hydration systems. 9 It is pressing because the procedures ha ve been perfected to the point where it is not difficult to keep numbers of people on feeding systems for long periods oftime. 1o It is also press ing because the moral line between medical inte rvention for therapeutic ends and ordinary hygienic ca re, in the case of nutrition and fluid s, cannot easily be drawn. At times it looks like ordinary care; at other moments , in other cases, it looks more like treatment which is futile and possibly burdensome as well. In still other cases it looks like both at once: perhaps a gesture of ordinary care, and if so, required ; but perhaps futile. and if so, unjustified. Some of us are tempted to seek refuge from this ambiguity in a moral posture which requires us always to feed.
Commenting on a study of phys ician attitudes on withdrawal of nutrition and fluids from terminally ill and comatose patients, Bayer noted that almost all of the doctors surveyed said that they would start IV feeding for a dying or comatose person. Noting further that 27 % of these doctors would order an amount of fluids which would be insufficient to sustain the person's life , Bayer suggests that their purpose in orderi 9g the feeding regimes may not have been "medical, but symbolic and psychological: to satisfy the physician's sense of duty, and to prepare the patient's family for the worst."ll He questions the moral validity of this kind of instinctive "sense of duty" on the part of the physician. It is precisely this which at times appears to be , in fact , a place of retreat from moral discernment at the expense of the patient.
Others also have spoken of what has come to be called the "symbolic" meaning of feeding. ' 2 Eating, drinking and feeding are among the most basic , even sacred, human activities, it is said. The issue of whether to feed or not to feed is such an emotional one for us, not only because it is about survival at its most primitive level , but also because the gesture of feeding another, especially infants and the disabled who are not able to feed themselves , is one of the most basic human ways to express caring and friendship. On the other hand , "artificial feeding reduces food intake to its barest essential-nourishment of the patient. It is introduced as a medical November, 1987 treatment and excludes the sensory, social and cultural pleasures and traditions associated with eating."1 3
Worries About Optional Feeding
Some are worried that if we admit that feeding is optional for some very ill people, we are implicitly admitting that some kind s of life are not worth sustaining. To declare feeding optional is to start down the slippery slope. For them , continuance of this fragile life, no matter how burdensome, is in itself a human good. To withhold or withdraw artificial feeding from a debilitated patient betrays our lack of regard for his or her life ; it is to reduce him or her to a burden. Those who assume this moral posture are particularly resistant to making feeding , even artificial feeding with its attendant risks , optional , because in their view it is contradictory to obligate ourselves to care for another while denying him or her food , the most basic human need. For them , the provision of nourishment is such an elemental human response to one in need that refusing to provide it threatens the humanity of both the needy person and the one who refuses to respond to that need.
And even for those of us who see mostly technical processes more or less anonymously at work, there is a vestige of the traditional "natural" meaning present in those gestures . Those who are involved in managing the feeding systems know, after all , that they are providing sustenance for another human being. And they know that if they don't provide it , that human being will die . The situation is different from the one in which the patient whose respirator is removedjust mal' begin to breathe on her own. And so we hesitate.
But can we honestly say that artificial feeding procedures a/wa\'s represent the most compassionate and respectful response to a patient? If we insist that we must a/ways feed a patient , no matter what his condition or his desires, are we really acting in a way which is consistent with the Catholic tradition? Or is it not often the case, rather, that those who order and administer feeding regimes are doing so becau t e they dare not discontinue them, and even that they dare not ask themselves whether these procedures are not from the patient's point of view, futile or excessively burdensome?
Enteral and parenteral nutrition systems which supplant the natural feeding activities rob the latter of virtually all of their human meaning . '4 The mechanisms themselves and many of the technical gestures employed to carry out the nutrition and hydration of the patient who is permanently comatose or very nearly dead , mask almost entirely a meaning we have learned to associate with the terms, "eating", "drinking", and even "feeding".
Consequently, there is a growing consensus among Catholic thinkers and others as well that there is no moral justification on the basis of the vestigial images of natural feeding barely present in nutrition / hydration systems, for invoking a moral principle which prohibits us categorically from withdrawing an art ificial feeding system. 15 Even though for us it is technically and psychologically convenient, "natural", to continue feeding, for this patient's good it may be time to withdraw. Mechanical , impersona l, invasive and risky feeding programs are experienced by some patients and their families as inhumane rather than as caring gestures. In some situat ions, for some patients, what is promoted by medical or nursing staff as the symbol of human compassion is totally emptied of its meaning. Some patients experience it as force feed ing, a treatment they'd rather be spared. Situations where restraints or sedation or both are required in order to feed an incompetent elderly patient dramatically portray the difficulty of determining the moral limits of what we call care.
A lth ough the line between a medical intervention with curative intent and comfort care cannot be cleanly drawn in abstraction from the decisions which have to be made about people's lives, guidelines can be formulated for morally responsible decision-making which are well founded in the Catholic tradition regarding the care of the terminally ill. A fundamental principle , to which we have already referred, is that a competent adult may refuse an y treatment , including feeding, which he finds to be excessively burdensome or futile. A physician who judges that the patient's decision to refuse treatment violates his sense of what is right, can withdraw from the case. When the adult patient is not competent , the first order of business is to establish as accurately as possible the patient's wishes from advance directives (e.g ., "living wills , " Christian Affirmation of Life") relatives and close friends. Then a determination about what to do must be made in light of the patient's present circumstances: how sick he is, how near death , how much pain he is in, is he "ready" to die, is his conscious life at such a low ebb that he has slipped into a "persistent vegetative state"?
Additional Guidelines Suggested
Such questions suggest further guidelines implied by the Catholic emphasis on the value of the individual patient's life and specified by the individual patient's condition and degree of awareness . One kind of patient , of course, who falls outside of the morally problematic, is the one who has been confirmed as dead , i.e. , whose spontaneous respiratory and cardiac functions have irreversibly ceased or whose total brain, including the brain stem, has irreversibly ceased to function.
Those who have been declared irreversibly comatose or in a "persistent vegetative state" (PYS), but not dead , represent one kind of patient about whom we do have to deliberate. Such patients have elicited serious moral and legal discussion , particularly since many of them survive for months or even years if they are fed . It is because we can , with technological assists, put them in a situation of long hopeless survival, that we have to ask the two fundamental questions which mark off the area of extraordinary or disproportionate means as articulated withing the Catholic moral community . First , we have to ask if, by sustaining the patient technologically. we are n ot imp os ing upon him a kind of s urviva l which is hurd enso m e to him. to his famil y and t o a ll those who bear the cost of such a d ec ision. If. lik e th e judge who ruled in the case of Paul Broph y. we are re luctant to re mo ve a feeding tube from a m a n who will n eve r reco ve r co nsciousness because to do so would re4uire us t o mak e ajudgment a bout the 4uality of his life . we still ha ve to weigh the second 4u es tion.' 6 We still ha ye to a s k. e\e n if he is not in pain . whether it is not futile to feed him i nsofa r as h e has no ho pe of e m e rgi ng fro m his vege ta t ive s ta te . To a ns wer that it is not futile hecau se it keeps him ali ve. of course. begs th e 4ues tion as to whether we o llght to ke e p him aliYe. To re frain from se riou sly e nt e rtaining this 4uestion is to neglect to consider the indiv idu al human heing . Paul Broph y. ade4uate ly. And to neg lect to consider him in all of his concrete circumstances is to misund e rs tand the traditional Catholic c mpha s is on th e patient as the m eas ure of what sh o uld be taken as ext raordinary or di s proportionate .
In th e Barhe r case. th e court he ld that th e 4ues tion of withdrawal of fee ding sh o uld he assessed ,. in tcrms of the proportionate he nefit to the patient: A numbe r of Catholic authors find justification in th e removal of life s upport. including fee ding systems. in th e appropriate s uhordination of th e e nd s of human life to its ultimate e nd. which transce nds the tcmporal. For them t o continue to feed a patie nt in a persiste nt vege tati ve state is to assign absolute va lu e to a certain very limited form of lill and in so doing.
t o diminish the ultimat e ly more va luabl e s pirituallifc of a pe rson ."
Another grou p o f patient s we need to consider carefully are those in th e la st stages o f te rminal illness . After clearly stat ing that we can nc ith e r di re ctl y take the life of a not her nor a sk a not her to assist in o u r s uicidc. the Dl!c/aratio/l O il Elitha/lasia also says that the patient (or. in thc case of incompe te nce. others on his or her be half) can "judge that the tec hni4ues applied impose on the patient strain or s uffe ring o ut o f proportion to th e be nefit s which he o r s he ma y gain from s uch tec hni4ues ." A nd again . Th e re continues to be much discussion over an a cce ptabl e definition of Linacrc Quarterly "imminent." To say that a person's death is imminent should probably mean that he or she ha s less than a year to live . Some would want to de-limit the time frame more narrowl y. In anycase. a decision to withhold nourishment from a terminall y ill person should not come before he is "ready to die." This moment is. of course. discerned on ly with d ifficu lt y and by weighing together all of the factors in the patient's condition and subjective attitude.
Some patients are in so much pain that they cannot bear th e prospect of lingering for a long time. There are times when those who are competent can legitimately refuse to be sustained by artificial feeding systems. Those who make decisions on behalf of incompetent patients have the difficult task of trying to discern whether the y are in pain and their degree of tolerance. For these patients. too. pain can constitute a burden which wou ld morally justify the request to withdraw feeding in th e la st stages of their illness.
One of the most difficult groups of people about whom to make nutritional support decisions IS the elderly who are seve rel y debilitated by age and sickness. but not on the brink of death. Lik e Claire Conroy. most of them have no one fatal disease . nor have they slipped into a persistent vegetative state. I'! But they are sick enough that they could die at any time and often the y are chronica ll y confused. severely or "pleasantly" senile. Not on ly do they have physiological disabilities which severe ly limit their capacity to swallow. digest and absorb food . but they have lost their interest in eating. Some actively resist attempts to feed them orally and with art ificial systems .
Decisions not to offer nutritional support to suc h elderly people shou ld rarely be made and only after much consu ltat ion and deliberation. They shou ld a ls o be constrained by procedural safeguards both within the institution and in the law. The Committee for Pro-Life Activities of the National Conference of Catho li c Bishops has recentl y issued two moral commen taries on legislation regarding decisions about life-su staini ng treatment. The tone a nd content of both the Guidelines/a" Le[;islalion on Lile-Sustaining Treallnel1l (November, 1984) and their SWlemenl on Un iform Righlsollhe Terminally !II ACI (June, 1986) 20 urge caution in the enactment of laws designed to facilitate termination of treatment decisions. And as Callahan and others have pointed out, current pressures to reduce health care costs create incentives to withhold treatment from the elderly and other vulnerable members of our society which can quickly lead to abuse of them. 21 The consultation and deliberation surrou nding the case of an eld erly person again should focus on what will promote the dignity of the person himself.
The New Jersey Supreme Court decision In re Conro.l' is instructive not on ly because it offered some clearly delineated tests of the incompetent patient's best interests, but a lso because it applied them to Claire Conroy's situation very conservatively. In the absence of any reliable indication of the patient's wishes , the Court said , a guardian'S request to terminate feeding co uld be honored if " the recurring, una voida ble and severe pain of the pati e nt 's life with the trea tment should be s uch that the effect of administering life -sustaining treatment would be inhumane." " Having weighed testimony about Conroy's condition, the Court rul ed that there was insuffici e nt evidence of pain to warrant the removal of the feeding tube .
Among their c riter ia for the withdrawal of nutritional support from d ying patients, Dresser and Boisaubin include that "if medical evidence suggests that discontinuin g nutriti o n would prod uce increased pain or discomfort, the pati e nt should be fed."~l At the same time, these authors acknowledge a need for more clinical information on th e degree to which specific fe eding regimes do , in fact. alleviate a g iven patie nt's distress and in general e nhance his / he r sense of well-being. They cite some evide nce which suggests that some hydration reg imes ma y even cause certain patients complications and discomfort which th ey would rather be spared.
In spite of what we intuiti ve ly feel about alleviating a pati en t's thirst. some are easily satisfied with ice c hips or a glycerine swab. There are reports from caregivers indicating that "death from water deficiency appears painl ess and peac e ful."~.j Others claim on the contrary that deh ydration brings on a set of conditions which arc anything but painless. Again, clinical observations s uch as these need to be carefully int er preted a lways through th e filt e r of compassionate support for the individual patie nt.
The Catholic moral tradition has mad e an important contribution to the current discussion about pro vi ding nutrition and hyd rati o n to th e ve ry sick . The Catholic posture is framed by a strong bias in favor of supporting life that is in constant tension with our need to accept finally the limitat ion of sickness and death . This pro-life attitude is the ex press ion of our be lief that by His death and resurrection, J esus Christ has transformed sickness and death into the fullness of life . Our faith gives us the freedom not to feel bound to use every available means to prolong te mporal life, but to di sce rn what is best for eac h pati en t. including in that discernment our hope for "ete rnal life", a life full y tran sfo rmed in Jes us Christ. ' Hast y decision s to withdraw nutriti o nal support should be avoided. Such decisions should be mad e with sufficient consultation and deliberation, es pec iall y to check our ten denc y to mak e them for costsaving reaso ns. The Catholic moral tradition, as it ha s developed in response to the cvo lution of medical practice, s upports th e view that the best interests of th e patient are protected if we defer to the patient himself o r herse lf. and if we e mplo y o nl y tho se measures including nutrition a nd hydrati o n which will help to s ust a in him without imp os ing on him excess ive burdens or futile treatme nt s . When feeding or o th e r life-support trea tm e nt s co nstitute a grave burd e n to th e patient or provide no th e rapeut ic benefit, there is no ob li gat ion -or eve n justification -for cont inuin g them. Co mpassi on and respect for the person, of course, re4uire that we continue to offe r him o r her mora l a nd spiritual support as lon g as he or she linge rs.
